美國前國务卿基辛格专访 / Interview with Henry Kissinger

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【文匯網訊】2012年1月13日央視《環球視線》播出《專訪美國前國務卿基辛格》，以下是節目實錄：

主持人勞春燕： 說起基辛格和中國的淵源，可以用這麼一串數字來概括，他在40年前掀開了「冷戰」的帷幕，和尼克松總統一起重啟了中美外交，並且在此後的40多年中，來過中國50多次。今年時值尼克松總統訪華40周年，基辛格再一次來到了中國。我的同事水均益昨天專訪了這位已經88歲的老人，一起來看一看。

解說： 2012年的新春伊始，對於中美關係來說非常具有紀念意義。40年前，1972年2月21日，美國總統尼克松正式訪華。2月28日，中美兩國發表了《中美聯合公報》，這兩個位於東西半球的大國交往之門終於被打開，而一位88歲的老人正是見證了這40年來中美走過的風雨歷程，他就是美國前國務卿基辛格。

字幕提示： 2012年1月12日北京 專訪美國前國務卿基辛格

水均益本台記者： 今年是尼克松總統首次訪華四十周年，您也要參加相關的周年紀念活動，跟我們談談這個周年紀念有多重要？
基辛格美國前國務卿： 國際社會體系發生了革命性的變化，在1972年之前的二十多年裡，美中兩國幾乎把對方視為敵人，美中雙方曾在台灣海峽發生軍事對峙，全世界當時都認為美中兩國有可能成為敵人，所以從美中雙邊關係正常化開始，我們逐漸從關係正常化走向合作，這也使得許多國家開始重新思考自己之前的政策。在這四十年裡，美中雙方在國際事務中，基本上都保持一致的步調，這是一件非常了不起的事情。
水均益： 您也非常樂意見證這個四十周年紀念活動？基辛格博士，現在有許多人特別是專家學者都表示，美國是一個正在衰落的大國，而中國是一個正在崛起的大國，或者我們可以從歷史上找到這樣的例子，這兩個大國可能有一天會在利益上發生摩擦，也許最終會導致衝突發生？
基辛格： 我是這樣認為的。世界格局已經同過去完全不一樣了。在過去，這樣的例子最終會導致國際事務中零和遊戲的出現，即一方獲勝，另一方失敗。但在今天，我認為如果美中關係之間發生衝突，那麼希望雙方都會是輸家。假如美中之間的外交關係徹底中斷了，那麼世界也會被分割，每個國家都要選擇站在哪邊，所以我不認同過去的規則，我認為當今如果發生衝突，任何國家都不可能獲溢，所以這也就是為什麼國家領導人在遇到這類問題時，會想方設法去解決它。所以我認為，這個猜想是錯誤的。無論如何，我們必須行動起來，證明這種猜想是錯誤的。
水均益： 我的理解是只要一種情況，那就是我們要做出正確的選擇，正確的決定。
基辛格： 這非常重要，這需要兩個國家，都做出正確的決定，光靠一個國家是無法完成的。

解說： 2012年新年伊始，美國政府宣佈調整軍事戰略，亞太地區尤其是西太平洋，將成為美國新的軍事戰略要點。近年來，美國一直在進行著戰略東移，也隨著這份新的國防戰略日益明朗化，即安全戰略的優先任務也由反恐、防擴散轉向了應對崛起大國，基辛格卻並不贊同美國決策層所謂遏制中國的戰略思維。在2011年出版的《論中國》中，他警告說，今天美國決策層仍然認為中國崛起與美國在太平洋地區的位置無法兼容，因此最好先敵視、遏制，如果這種思維方式持續、蔓延，那僵局將不可避免，嚴重時，甚至可能導致下一場「冷戰」。

水均益： 那麼您如何解讀奧巴馬政府最近提出的新軍事戰略報告？
基辛格： 就像他所說的我們不會減少在亞洲的軍事存在，我認為這不意味著軍事力量的增加，而是一種重新部署，我認為奧巴馬的戰略會在美國國內引發大討論，但不會影響我們兩國之間的關係。
水均益： 很多中國人從不同的方向解讀了這份報告，因為我們會有很多次聽到奧巴馬總統以及希拉裡國務卿都說過，美國要重返亞洲，而最近的這份報告還把中國稱為潛在的對手。
基辛格： 你看你們就生活在亞洲，我從來就不知道我們曾經離開過亞洲，又要重返亞洲。
水均益： 那為什麼說要重返亞洲呢？
基辛格： 我們一直就在亞洲，所以重返亞洲，只是人們的一種說辭，但這沒有改變我的基本觀念，那就是美中關係應保持良好的發展態勢。
水均益： 所以說，您並不贊同這樣一種觀點，那就是中國會成為美國的挑戰者。
基辛格： 我認為不應該把中國視為軍事上的挑戰或者是經濟上的挑戰，我認為中國也不應將美國視為軍事上的挑戰，我們應當增加互信，因此我們沒有必要投入大量額外的經費去搞軍備競爭。

解說： 2011年下半年，美伊關係驟然緊張。11月8日，國際原子能機構出台《伊朗核報告》，自後西方社會對伊朗的喊打聲一直不絕於耳。12月24日，伊朗海軍在霍爾木茲海峽舉行了為期10天代號為「守衛-90」的大規模軍事演習，以回應美國和歐盟近日對伊出台的多項制裁措施。一時間，波斯灣上空似乎充滿了硝煙的味道。

薩亞里伊朗海軍司令： 我們掌控霍爾木茲海峽的安全，我們控制著霍爾木茲海峽。

解說： 然而，就在霍爾木茲海峽在伊朗軍演期間，美國「約翰·斯坦尼斯」號航母還曾穿越霍爾木茲海峽進行例行活動。對美國來說，這裡是中東戰略咽喉。對伊朗政府來說，這裡是安全前沿。如今全世界的目光都集中在這裡，所有媒體都在等待一個消息，戰火是否一觸即發？

水均益： 另一個當今熱門話題：伊朗問題，特別是伊朗人現在威脅要封鎖霍爾木茲海峽，美國表示這是紅線。如果伊朗封鎖霍爾木茲海峽，美國就會採取行動，美國和伊朗有可能發生戰爭嗎？
基辛格： 我認為伊朗不會封鎖霍爾木茲海峽，在這個問題上我支持美國政府，因為如果霍爾木茲海峽遭封鎖，全世界的油價都會飆升，這會給全世界造成重大經濟問題，甚至會造成經濟蕭條，任何國家都不應該這麼做。我認為，假如霍爾木茲海峽遭封鎖，美國會尋求其它國家的支持，採取行動重新開放霍爾木茲海峽，但我不想看到這件事情發生。
水均益： 基辛格博士，最後一個問題，您對於所謂的西亞北非局勢動盪的看法，特別是最近的焦點是敘利亞，敘利亞再一次同西方國家或者說美國發生了對抗，跟我們談談，您如何看待這些發生在阿拉伯世界的事情。
基辛格： 在西亞北非局勢動盪中，有很多國家發生了革命，它們經歷了政權交替，遭受了很多挫折，但有一個事實是，對於許多發生革命的國家來說，當革命結束的時候，他們必須要建立一個有能力解決問題的政府，那些重新組建的政府，也需要制定建設性的政策，敘利亞還沒有到這一步。
水均益： 非常感謝，感謝您接受我的採訪。

勞春燕： 以上就是今天的《環球視線》，感謝您的陪伴，再見。
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Avoiding a U.S.-China cold war

By Henry A. Kissinger

Friday, January 14, 2011 Washington Post

The upcoming summit between the American and Chinese presidents is to take place while progress is being made in resolving many of the issues before them, and a positive communique is probable. Yet both leaders also face an opinion among elites in their countries emphasizing conflict rather than cooperation.

Most Chinese I encounter outside of government, and some in government, seem convinced that the United States seeks to contain China and to constrict its rise. American strategic thinkers are calling attention to China's increasing global economic reach and the growing capability of its military forces.

Care must be taken lest both sides analyze themselves into self-fulfilling prophecies. The nature of globalization and the reach of modern technology oblige the United States and China to interact around the world. A Cold War between them would bring about an international choosing of sides, spreading disputes into internal politics of every region at a time when issues such as nuclear proliferation, the environment, energy and climate require a comprehensive global solution.

Conflict is not inherent in a nation's rise. The United States in the 20th century is an example of a state achieving eminence without conflict with the then-dominant countries. Nor was the often-cited German-British conflict inevitable. Thoughtless and provocative policies played a role in transforming European diplomacy into a zero-sum game.

Sino-U.S. relations need not take such a turn. On most contemporary issues, the two countries cooperate adequately; what the two countries lack is an overarching concept for their interaction. During the Cold War, a common adversary supplied the bond. Common concepts have not yet emerged from the multiplicity of new tasks facing a globalized world undergoing political, economic and technological upheaval.

That is not a simple matter. For it implies subordinating national aspirations to a vision of a global order.

Neither the United States nor China has experience in such a task. Each assumes its national values to be both unique and of a kind to which other peoples naturally aspire. Reconciling the two versions of exceptionalism is the deepest challenge of the Sino-American relationship.

America's exceptionalism finds it natural to condition its conduct toward other societies on their acceptance of American values. Most Chinese see their country's rise not as a challenge to America but as heralding a return to the normal state of affairs when China was preeminent. In the Chinese view, it is the past 200 years of relative weakness - not China's current resurgence - that represent an abnormality.

America historically has acted as if it could participate in or withdraw from international affairs at will. In the Chinese perception of itself as the Middle Kingdom, the idea of the sovereign equality of states was unknown. Until the end of the 19th century, China treated foreign countries as various categories of vassals. China never encountered a country of comparable magnitude until European armies imposed an end to its seclusion. A foreign ministry was not established until 1861, and then primarily for dealing with colonialist invaders.

America has found most problems it recognized as soluble. China, in its history of millennia, came to believe that few problems have ultimate solutions. America has a problem-solving approach; China is comfortable managing contradictions without assuming they are resolvable.

American diplomacy pursues specific outcomes with single-minded determination. Chinese negotiators are more likely to view the process as combining political, economic and strategic elements and to seek outcomes via an extended process. American negotiators become restless and impatient with deadlocks; Chinese negotiators consider them the inevitable mechanism of negotiation. American negotiators represent a society that has never suffered national catastrophe - except the Civil War, which is not viewed as an international experience. Chinese negotiators cannot forget the century of humiliation when foreign armies exacted tribute from a prostrate China. Chinese leaders are extremely sensitive to the slightest implication of condescension and are apt to translate American insistence as lack of respect.

North Korea provides a good example of differences in perspective. America is focused on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. China, which in the long run has more to fear from nuclear weapons there than we, in addition emphasizes propinquity. It is concerned about the turmoil that might follow if pressures on nonproliferation lead to the disintegration of the North Korean regime. America seeks a concrete solution to a specific problem. China views any such outcome as a midpoint in a series of interrelated challenges, with no finite end, about the future of Northeast Asia. For real progress, diplomacy with Korea needs a broader base.

Americans frequently appeal to China to prove its sense of "international responsibility" by contributing to the solution of a particular problem. The proposition that China must prove its bona fides is grating to a country that regards itself as adjusting to membership in an international system designed in its absence on the basis of programs it did not participate in developing.

While America pursues pragmatic policies, China tends to view these policies as part of a general design. Indeed, it tends to find a rationale for essentially domestically driven initiatives in terms of an overall strategy to hold China down.

The test of world order is the extent to which the contending can reassure each other. In the American-Chinese relationship, the overriding reality is that neither country will ever be able to dominate the other and that conflict between them would exhaust their societies. Can they find a conceptual framework to express this reality? A concept of a Pacific community could become an organizing principle of the 21st century to avoid the formation of blocs. For this, they need a consultative mechanism that permits the elaboration of common long-term objectives and coordinates the positions of the two countries at international conferences.

The aim should be to create a tradition of respect and cooperation so that the successors of leaders meeting now continue to see it in their interest to build an emerging world order as a joint enterprise.

The writer was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977.

THIS STORY

· Political reform: China's next modernization?

· Avoiding a U.S.-China cold war

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/13/AR2011011304832.html